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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 04/01/2008 Accident number: 459 
Accident time: 08:57 Accident Date: 10/07/2004 
Where it occurred: MF ID 11162,  
"Tvornica -BNT- 
Slimena 1", Slime 
Village, Travnik  
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: 19/07/2004 
ID original source: Broj: 02-OK-15-
3647/04 
Name of source: BHMAC WL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  




Date record created: 04/01/2008 Date  last modified: 04/01/2008 
No of victims: 4 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: G/K 6474676 4895881 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
1 
Accident report 
This report was made available in 2006 and translated in 2007 specifically for entry to the 
DDAS. The content of the reports that were made available has been edited for anonymity 
and is summarised below. 
Based on an initial report delivered to BHMAC by the demining organisation on the 10th of 
July 2004, the director of BHMAC formed an investigative committee with the following 
members: [Name removed] (presiding), [Name removed], [Name removed] and [Name 
removed]. This committee created a report which is the main information source for the 
DDAS. Another document from BHMAC was available: “Lessons Learned from the Demining 
Accident on 7 March 2004”, dated 22 July 2004, three days after the accident report, signed 
by the BHMAC director, [Name removed]. This second document contains no new information 
and repeats the recommendations of the investigative committee.   
 
Conditions at the site 
Before the investigative committee arrived to the scene of accident, the police (MUP Travnik) 
had already finished their investigation. The killed deminer had already been transported from 
the scene of accident. As a member of the police force, one of the members of the BHMAC 
investigative committee, [Name removed], had participated in the police investigation.  
The purpose of the demining task was to enable safe work in the factory BNT. The part next 
to the fence was mined by the Yugoslav Peoples Army at the beginning of the war. The 
Croatian Defence Council and the Army of B&H fought against each other at that area later. 
After the war, there were two mine-related accidents inside the factory. Three PROM-1 mines 
were removed by the municipality branch of the Civil Defence Travnik in 1997.  
The most risky part of the demining task is the area between the asphalt areas in the back 
yard of the factory. The area towards the fence is tilted [sloping]. These tilted areas are used 
(the factory was working at the time of the clearance operation) for the disposal of metal 
waste from the factory and branches from the neighbouring trees. On this risky area, the 
vegetation is dense and high with grass, bushes and some trees. At the time of accident, the 
weather was clear and sunny, temperature 20 degrees.  
 
[The site of the accident.] 
The work-site layout and marking  




Supervision and discipline on the work-site; quality assurance 
The team leader was [Name removed], who is knowledgeable and experienced. The next 
level of supervision was the work-site leader (name not given). According to available 
records, there had been no significant objections to the organisation and the discipline at the 
work-site. Internal quality control was conducted by [Name removed], twice a week. His 
reports from the last month contained no important objections. However, the inspections of 
RO Travnik of BHMAC had reported some critical mistakes during five previous visits to the 
work site. They found a metal piece 3x3cm on an area cleared with prodders; visible metal 
fragments on cleared areas; broken marking tapes; large productivity in a lane cleared with a 
prodder; an area of 2 m2 covered with rubble not searched at all. All mistakes had been 
corrected within a given deadline. Additional monitoring was performed by SFOR (UN 
protection forces), but their reports are not delivered to the work-site.  
 
Communication and connections 
The communications meet the National Standard. Mostly mobile phones are used.  
 
The accident and the medical support  
The medical support was appropriate (equipment, vehicle and personnel). The Paramedic 
was Ms [Name removed]. The accident required additional vehicles because four persons 
were injured. An ordinary vehicle was used for transport of some injured deminers. After the 
accident, deminer [Name removed] provided the first aid. After three minutes the paramedic 
arrived at the scene of accident with her vehicle. Deminer [Victim No.1] was conscious, so 
she gave him first-aid. The other three victims were not moving. [Victim No.1] was moved to 
the first-aid vehicle and transported to the nearest hospital. The paramedic stayed at the 
work-site. She gave first-aid to [Victim No.2], whose artery on his left leg was bleeding. She 
also helped him to breath. After that she felt the pulse of [Victim No.3] – his pulse was very 
weak. The team leader and some workers from the factory gathered at the site of accident. 
[Victim No.2] was transported to hospital Travnik with a civilian vehicle borrowed from the 
factory, the paramedic travelling with him. She came back quickly afterwards; a medical 
vehicle had arrived already to the work-site. [Victim No.3] was transported to the hospital, 
together with the paramedic. Meanwhile, other two medical vehicles appeared (from the 
Health Centre Travnik and SFOR), but they were not needed, since [Victim No.4] showed no 
signs of life.  
[Victim No.3] died on the way to hospital. [Victim No.1 and No,2] were treated in the hospital 
and transported to the Clinical Hospital Centre Koševo in Sarajevo. They lives are still in 
danger and they are still unconscious.  
The paramedic acted according to the rules of her profession.  
All deminers were insured according to the requirements of the law and the National 
Standards. 
 
PPE and tools 
PPE (frag jacket, and a helmet with a visor) was found to be lying away from the scene of 
accident. It is obvious that it was not used at the time of accident. If it had been used, it would 
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not significantly reduce the injuries. Two shears were found near the scene of the accident, 
two secateurs, a small saw and an antenna for tripwire detection. No prodders and no shovels 
were found. However, the team leader claimed that the deminers had PPE, detectors, 
prodders, shovels, shears and base sticks.  
 
[Blood stained shears found near the victims.] 
The area was highly metal-contaminated, 20% could be cleared with the help of metal-
detectors, the remaining 80% with prodders. Prodding to the required 10 cm depth was 
difficult because of many stones, excavation was often used. The detectors were functional 
(UPMAH detonator contained in PMA-3 could be detected at 10 cm depth [presumably in 
air]).  
On the day of accident, the base stick was not used in the lane where the accident occurred. 
The marking with 0.5 m high sticks and a tape was not applied. Some vegetation was being 
cut. Four deminers were working close to each other and one of them activated the mine, 
probably by stepping on it, while pulling out some old dry branches through which some new 
vegetation had grown.  
The reported productivity (reported by the team leader, 8-25 m2) is realistic.  
 
The mine 
PROM-1 was probably buried to be activated with a tripwire, but it was hidden in vegetation, 
so that it could be activated by stepping on it. A tripwire was not found. [The base-plate of the 
mine was found and photographed.] Another PROM-1 had been found during the same 
clearance operation. Another three PROM-1 mines were found in 1997. A found PMR-2A and 
seven PMA-3 mines, clearly pointed to the danger.  
 
Conclusion 
The cause of the accident: wanton violation of technical and safety procedures proscribed in 
the SOPs of the organisation and in the National Standards of B&H.  
1. 4 persons instead of 2 working in the same lane (although 2 were planned by the 
team leader). 
2. PPE not worn.  
3. mutual distance between deminers too small (should have been 50 m). 
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4. violation of procedures by the assistant of the team leader, who took the assignment 




1. to follow SOPs and the Standard. 
2. to do more internal quality control, unannounced visits are recommended. 
3. to organise one-day training with all VF-B teams, to teach them about the causes of 
this accident. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 606 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 32 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: Severe fragmentation injury. Dead at the site. No Medical report was made 
available. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 607 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 32 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: Severe fragmentation injuries. Died on way to hospital. No Medical report was 
made available. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 608 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 38 Gender: Male 
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Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: Severe fragmentation injuries. Unconscious in hospital at the time of the report. 
No Medical report was made available. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 609 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 34 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Leg 
COMMENT: Arterial bleeding. Unconscious in hospital at time of report. No Medical report 
was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The investigators found that the main cause of the accident was “wanton violation of technical 
and safety procedures proscribed in the SOPs of the organisation and in the National 
Standards of B&H”. For this reason the primary cause of the accident is listed as a 
“Management control inadequacy”. So many basic safety rules were being breached at a site 
where there was known to be a fragmentation mine threat that the conditions must have been 
known to senior management. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” 
because the field managers allowed safety distances and PPE rules to be ignored. 
The failure of those with National responsibility to suspend the accreditation of those 
responsible for such an unprofessional effort would be surprising if it were not for the fact that 
demining group involved are apparently a branch of the national military. Nonetheless, their 
lack of professionalism should be addressed with urgency.  
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